1.
What do you mean by financial
management? Explain the function of financial management.
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The functions of financial management can
be categorized into two types i.e. Executive finance function and Routine
finance function that are explained as follows:
1) Executive
finance function:
2)
Routine finance function:
2.
What is wealth maximization? Why is
wealth maximization superior goal to profit maximization?
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Wealth maximization is
superior goal to profit maximization because it has following best aspects than
profit maximization.
a) Shareholder wealth maximization goal is clear:
Shareholder
wealth maximization goal requires that every financial decision be evaluated in
terms of cash flow; the term cash flow is explicit. According to this goal, the
cost and benefits of every decision are measured in terms of cash flow rather
than in terms of accounting profit.
b)
It considers the timing of cash flow:
The cash flow occurring at two different points in time have different
value, hence not comparable.
3.
Differentiate profit maximization and
stock price maximization.
4.
Explain the finance function in the
organization structure of the firm with the help of suitable chart.
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It has long been recognized that managers may have
personal goals that compete with shareholder wealth maximization. Managers are
empowered by the owners of the firm—the shareholder—to make decisions and that
creates a potential conflict of interest known as agency problem. There
are two types of agency problem i.e. agency problem between shareholders and
managers, and agency problem between shareholders and creditors.
i.
Agency problem between shareholders and
managers
Mechanism to resolve the conflict of interests
between Shareholders and Manager
a)
Managerial
compensation
b)
Direct
intervention by shareholders
c)
The
threat of firing
d)
The
threat of hostile takeover
ii.
Agency problem between shareholders and
creditors